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Abstract
In this work, we present IBFT 2.0 (Istanbul BFT 2.0), which is a Proof-of-Authority (PoA) Byzantine-
fault-tolerant (BFT) blockchain consensus protocols that (i) ensures immediate finality, (ii) is robust in an
eventually synchronous network model and (iii) features a dynamic validator set. IBFT 2.0, as the name
suggests, builds upon the IBFT blockchain consensus protocol retaining all of the original features while
addressing the safety and liveness limitations described in one of our previous works. In this paper, we
present a high-level description of the IBFT 2.0 protocol and related robustness proof. Formal specification
of the protocol and related formal proofs will be subject of a separate body of work. We also envision a
separate work that will provide detailed implementation specifications for IBFT 2.0.
1 Introduction
IBFT 2.0 is Proof-of-Authority (PoA) Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (BFT) blockchain consensus protocol that
enables consortium network to leverage on the capabilities of Ethereum smart contracts, ensures immediate
finality, is robust in an eventually synchronous network and features a dynamic validator set. As the name
suggests, the IBFT 2.0 protocol is based on the IBFT protocol that was was developed around early 2017 by
AMIS Technologies [11] and was fully implemented in Quorum [14] by around November 2017. The IBFT
protocol features all of the properties of the IBFT 2.0 protocol mentioned above except for robustness in
eventually synchronous networks as identified by Saltini [15]. IBFT 2.0 addresses the robustness issues of the
IBFT protocol while maintaining all of its original properties. In the following section we describe each of
these properties in more detail.
1.1 Properties of the IBFT 2.0 protocol
Blockchain consensus protocol. Blockchains are the most widely adopted implementations of distributed
ledgers which are append-only databases of transactions that are replicated across multiple participants, here-
after called nodes. The trust and responsibility for maintaining the database is spread across all of the nodes
or a subset of them. This is in contrast to a traditional centralised system where full trust is given to a central
authority responsible for maintaining the database. One of the issues with this traditional approach is that the
central authority has the power to alter the database unilaterally. The decentralisation aspect of distributed
ledger technology makes it well suited to any use case where the need for a central authority is either adding
costs to the system or undermining the trust in the system itself. Blockchains implements distributed ledgers
by batching transactions into blocks and cryptographically linking each block to the previous one forming a
chain of blocks, which is where the technology takes its name from. Consensus protocols play a fundamental
role in the blockchain technology as they have the responsibility to ensure that the chain of blocks replicated
amongst the nodes is consistent. The type of network and environment assumptions made when designing a
consensus protocol influence how the blockchain performs once deployed in a real environment and network.
Some of the key performance metrics that are heavily influenced by consensus protocols are: (i) throughput
or number of transactions per second, (ii) latency or time taken from when a transaction is submitted to the
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system to when the transaction is included in a block and (iii) robustness or what type of attacks the protocol
can withstand.
Ethereum smart contracts. Compared to Bitcoin, which was the first widely adopted blockchain and
mainly allows transferring values between nodes, the Ethereum blockchain specifies a Turing-complete language
that can be used to build small distributed programs, called smart contracts, that are executed in a sandboxed
runtime by each node. The runtime, called the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) modifies the Ethereum global
state maintained by each node. This means that any user of the Ethereum blockchain has the capability to
create smart contracts that can govern the interaction between the different users of the system and automate
value transfer in a decentralised fashion. One of the first use cases for Ethereum was the creation of escrow
smart contracts eliminating the need for a trusted 3rd party.
Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT). Byzantine-fault-tolerant, or BFT, specifies the type of node fault mode
that the consensus protocol can cope with. Specifically, BFT identifies a class of blockchain consensus protocols
that ensure blockchain consistency despite some of the nodes, referred to as Byzantine, being malicious and
acting arbitrarily. The usage of the word Byzantine to identify malicious nodes dates back to the paper “The
Byzantine Generals Problem” by Lamport et al. [10]. The Byzantine failure mode is the strongest failure mode
considered in the consensus protocol literature. Another common but weaker failure mode is fail-stop failure
mode which only considers nodes stopping communicating but never acting maliciously.
Proof-of-Authority (PoA). Another way to classify consensus protocols is by the technique used to prevent
an attacker from conducting a Sybil attack which consists in one node being able to gain power in the system
by creating multiples pseudonymous identities. Typically, creating a new digital identity that can be used to
interact with a blockchain is quite cheap as it just requires generating a random private key and the related
public key which can be done in a matter of few seconds on any modern personal computer. One the most
widely used and famous techniques for preventing Sybil attacks is proof of work which was originally pioneered
by Dwork et al. [6] and gained subsequent publicity by its employment in Bitcoin. Proof-of-work (PoW)
requires node to spend compute effort in solving a hard cryptographic puzzle before being able to propose
a block to be added to the blockchain. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is another quite well known technique where
the right to propose new blocks is given according to the amount of stake owned. In contrast, in Proof-of-
Authority, or PoA, Sybil attacks are prevented by conferring the right to create new blocks only to a defined
set of nodes. Within the IBFT 2.0 protocol, the nodes with the right to create new blocks and ensuring
blockchain consistency are called validators.
Consortium Blockchain. Compared to permissionless, or public, blockchains, like Bitcoin or Ethereum,
where anybody can join the network and participate in the protocol, in consortium networks there exists some
level of permissioning which enables only a set of nodes in proposing new blocks and participating in the
consensus protocol. It should be quite evident why PoA type consensus protocols, like the IBFT protocol
family, are well suited to this type of permissioning. It should be noted that while not every node can propose
new blocks, some consortium blockchains allow any node to read data from the blockchain. The IBFT protocol
family also affords for this type of configuration.
Immediate Finality. A transaction is defined as final once it is included in the blockchain and it can not
be removed from it or changed of position except if the environment is compromised, which, for example, can
occur if the number of Byzantine nodes is higher than the maximum number that the protocol can withstand.
Immediate finality means that as soon as a transaction is included in a block, the protocol guarantees that it will
not be removed or changed of position. As comparison, the PoW consensus protocol in Bitcoin and Ethereum
only guarantees eventual probabilistic finality where the deeper a transaction is in the blockchain, the less
probable is that the transaction can be removed or changed of position. As further comparison, Casper FFG
[2], the Ethereum 2.0 PoS consensus protocol, provides eventual “non-probabilistic” finality, where transaction
will eventually reach a state where they cannot be removed or moved of position but this does not necessarily
happen at every block. In IBFT 2.0 finality is immediate.
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Robustness. Our definition of robustness for the IBFT protocol family is based on the definition of robust-
ness for public transaction ledgers provided in Garay et al. [9].
For the purpose of this definition, the position of a transaction within the transaction ledger implemented by
the IBFT 2.0 protocol is defined as a pair with the first component corresponding to the height of the block
including the transaction and the second component corresponding to the position of the transaction within
the block.
Definition 1. A blockchain consensus protocol implements a robust distributed permissioned transaction
ledger with immediate finality and t-Byzantine-fault-tolerance if, provided that no more than t validators are
Byzantine, it guarantees the following two properties:
• Persistence. If an honest node adds transaction T in position i of its local transaction ledger, then
(i) T is the only transaction that can ever be added in position i by any other honest node, (ii) T will
eventually be added to the local transaction ledger of any other honest node.
• Liveness. Provided that a transaction is submitted to all honest validators, then the transaction will
eventually be included in the local transaction ledger of at least one honest node.
Eventually synchronous network. In the consensus protocol literature there are three main network
models that have been considered which differ on the assumption made regarding transmission latency:
• Synchronous network: the maximum latency (time required for a message to reach the recipient) is
bounded and known;
• Asynchronous network: the maximum latency is unknown and messages may never be delivered;
• Partially synchronous network: this model, which was first introduced by Dwork et al. [5], lies in between
the other two. Specifically, there are two possible definitions of partial synchrony:
– Messages are guaranteed to be delivered but the maximum latency, while finite, is unknown. To
the best of our knowledge, no specific name has been defined for this model;
– Eventually synchronous network: there exists a point in time, called global stabilisation time, or
GST, after which the message delay is bounded by a finite and constant value;
The model with the weakest assumptions is the asynchronous network model, followed by the partially syn-
chronous network model and the synchronous network model in this order. Between the two definitions of
partial synchrony, eventual synchrony is the one with the weakest assumptions. As proved by Fischer et al. [8]
in 1985, no consensus protocol that aims to tolerate at least one fail-stop node is guaranteed to terminate
in the asynchronous model (the one with the weakest assumption). There exist solutions that operate in the
asynchronous network model, but the termination is only guaranteed probabilistically [1, 12]. The IBFT 2.0
protocol guarantees deterministic termination of the sub-protocol that has the responsibility to decide on the
blocks to be added to the blockchain which means that IBFT 2.0 guarantees that the blockchain does not
stop growing. However, as discussed in the robustness proof section, a probabilistic assumption is required
to show that for any block there is eventually a block created successively to it which is not empty. This
second condition is important for the Liveness property stated above. In Section 5.1.1, we discuss how the
IBFT 2.0 protocol can be modified to drop any probabilistic assumption and achieve deterministic robustness
under the eventually synchronous network model which is the weakest assumption where termination can be
deterministically guaranteed.
Dynamic validator set. Compared to classic (non-blockchain) consensus protocols like PBFT [3], where
the set of protocol nodes is known in advance and never changes, IBFT 2.0, like Clique, allows the nodes to
add and remove validators by a voting mechanism.
1.2 Our Contribution
As mentioned above, IBFT 2.0 builds upon the IBFT consensus protocol [11, 14] addressing the following
limitations of IBFT as described by Saltini [15].
• Persistence is not guaranteed.
– One Byzantine validator can potentially be able to remove or change the position of a transaction
that has already been finalised.
– In a network of six validators, even if all validators are honest, a network partitioning can cause
the blockchains maintained by two sets of three validators each to diverge. Once the partitioning is
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resolved, validators have to choose one chain which means removing or reordering the transactions
of the other chain.
– IBFT does not guarantee that a transaction added to the local blockchain of one validator is
eventually added to the local blockchain of all other nodes.
• Liveness is not guaranteed. Specifically, the IBFT protocol may reach a state where no new blocks can
be added to any local blockchain which means that no new transactions can be added to the distributed
ledger.
While “Correctness Analysis of IBFT” [15] proposes a clear solution for addressing the issues with the Per-
sistence property of the IBFT protocol, it only sketches two possible solutions to the Liveness issue without
providing a full description of the resulting protocol. As a contribution, this work defines a complete solution
to the Persistence and Liveness issues identified in [15] and provides related robustness proof.
In this work we present a protocol-level model of the IBFT 2.0 consensus protocol well suited for reasoning
about the robustness of the protocol by abstracting the details of the actual implementation [13]. We envision
releasing a future body of work describing the details of the implementation (e.g. precise encoding of the
messages, precise definition of the header structure) which can be used to create interoperable implementation
of the protocol in any Ethereum client. We also envision to produce a more formal definition of the protocol
using formal languages (e.g. TLA+, Verdi, Alloy) and use formal proof systems to prove the properties of the
protocol.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our analysis model. In Section 3 we describe the
IBFT 2.0 protocol as implemented in Pantheon [13]. In Section 4 we present the robustness analysis of the
IBFT 2.0 protocol and in Section 5 we present a series of improvements that can applied to the IBFT 2.0
protocol.
2 System Model
The system model considered for IBFT 2.0 is the same system model considered in the analysis of IBFT [15].
We re-state the properties of the model here for convenience.
Asynchronous nodes. We consider a system composed of an unbounded number of asynchronous nodes,
each of them maintaining a local copy of the blockchain obtained by adding blocks to it as specified by the
IBFT 2.0 protocol. We assume that all nodes have the same genesis block.
Network Model. The IBFT 2.0 protocol relies on the Ethereum ÐΞVp2p protocol for the delivering of all
protocol messages. We model the gossip network as an eventually synchronous network, as defined in Dwork
et al. [5], where there exists a point in time called global stabilisation time (GST), after which the message
delay is bounded by a constant, ∆. Before GST there is not bound on the message delay and we admit
messages being lost.
Failure Model. We consider a Byzantine failure mode system, where Byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily.
In contrast, honest nodes never diverge from the protocol definition. We denote the maximum number of
Byzantine nodes that an eventually synchronous network of n nodes participating in the consensus protocol
can be tolerant to with f(n). As proved in Dwork et al. [5], the relationship between the total number of
nodes, n, and the maximum number of Byzantine nodes can be expressed as follows:
f(n) ≡
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
(1)
Cryptographic Primitives. The IBFT 2.0 protocol uses the Keccak hash function variant as per Ethereum
Yellow Paper [16] to produce digests of blocks. We assume that the Keccak hash function is collision-resistant.
The IBFT 2.0 protocol relies on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature scheme already used in the Ethereum
protocol to sign transactions. We assume that this signature scheme ensures uniqueness and unforgeability.
Uniqueness means that the signatures generated for two distinct messages are different with high probability.
The unforgeability property ensures that Byzantine nodes, even if they collude, cannot forge digital signatures
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produced by honest nodes.
We use 〈m〉σv to denote a message m signed by validator v.
3 Protocol Description
In this section we provide a description of the IBFT 2.0 protocol. We write “IBFT 2.0 (IBFT)” to indicate
sections of the descriptions that apply to both IBFT and IBFT 2.0.
As common to any blockchain implementation, each IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node maintains a local copy of the
blockchain where the first block, called genesis block, is the same for all nodes. Each block B added to the
blockchain must be cryptographically linked to another block in the blockchain, Bp which is commonly defined
as the parent of block B, and, conversely, B is defined as the child of Bp. In IBFT 2.0 (IBFT), starting
from the genesis block, the next block to be added to the local blockchain maintained by a node is the child
of the latest block that was added to the blockchain. As it may be evident by now, the IBFT 2.0 (IBFT)
blockchain can be modelled as a linked list of blocks, rather than a tree like the public Ethereum blockchain.
In alignment with the terminology used in literature, the height of a block is defined as the number of parent
links separating the block from the genesis block which has height 0.
The IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) protocol can be modelled as running sequential instances of what we call the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol, where the objective of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
is to decide which Ethereum block, and consequently which set of transactions, are to be added at height h
of the blockchain maintained by any IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node. Only a subset of the entire set of IBFT 2.0
(IBFT) nodes can participate in the h-th instance of the block finalisation protocol. We call this set of nodes
the validators for height/instance h and refer to each member of this set as a validator for height/instance h.
We also refer to all of the nodes not included in the validator set for height/instance h as standard nodes. We
often omit for height/instance h when this is clear from the context. The set of validators for each instance
h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is deterministically computed as function of the chain of blocks
from the genesis block until the block with height h− 1.
As explained in more detail in the following section, each instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is
organised in rounds and in each round one of the validators is given the responsibility to propose an Ethereum
block for the height associated with the specific instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol that the
validator is running. Once agreement is reached, the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol creates a finalised
block which includes the Ethereum block and additional information that allows any node, even nodes that did
not participate in the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, to verify that agreement on the Ethereum block
included in the finalised block was correctly reached.
In practice, each IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node adds finalised blocks to its local blockchain, not only the Ethereum
blocks included in them. In this way, any node joining the network at any point in time, when synching
its local blockchain with its peers, receives all the information required to verify that agreement was indeed
reached correctly on each block that it receives, even on those created before it joined the network. Each IBFT
2.0 finalised block FB can be modelled by the tuple (FBEB,FBFP ) where FBEB is the Ethereum block to be
added to the blockchain, FBFP is the proof that agreement was correctly reached on the position in the chain
of the block FBEB.
Each finalisation proof FP can be in turn modelled by the tuple (FBr, FBCS) where FBr is the round number
of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol during the execution of which agreement on the block inclusion in
the blockchain was reached and FBCS is a list of signatures on both the Ethereum block and the round proving
that agreement was indeed reached by a correct execution of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol. More
detail on how this list of signatures, called commit seals, are computed is presented in Section 3.1.
Each Ethereum block can carry a vote, cast by the proposer of that block, to add a validator to or remove a
validator from the validator set. Once more than half of the validators cast a consistent vote to add or remove
a validator to/from the validator set, the validator is added or removed from the validator set starting from
the next block and all of the votes targeting this validator are discarded. In this paper we do not provide a
pseudocode description of this algorithm, but we may add it to a future revision of this work.
The IBFT 2.0 consensus protocol is described by the pseudocode in Algorithms 1 and 2 where:
• Statements are expressed in a mathematical form but with standard mathematical symbols replaced
by their equivalent English version, e.g we write in rather than ∈, and rather than ∧, there exists
rather than ∃ and so on. Our intent is to provide an unambiguous definition of the protocol which can be
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understood by people that are not familiar with standard mathematical notation. Also, comments identi-
fied by text in typewriter font and green colour are used to provide natural language description
of pseudocode statements which may not be immediately obvious;
• For brevity of notation, we avoid using individual existential quantifiers (i.e ∃ in mathematical nota-
tion and there exists in “English notation”) for message fields but rather express existential quanti-
fier on the entire message. We use an overhead line (e.g var), to indicate message fields that, if the
extensive notation was used, then they should be expressed via an existential quantifier. For example
there exists 〈f1, f2〉 in receivedMessagesv stands for there exists f2 such that there exists 〈f1, f2〉 ∈
receivedMessagesv;
• Each of the upon blocks in the pseudocode is assumed to be executed atomically when the condition
specified after the upon keyword is satisfied;
• All functions in typewriter font are defined in the remainder of this section, whereas all functions in
italic font are defined in the pseudocode;
• receivedMessagesv corresponds to the set of all messages received by node v;
• peersv corresponds to the set of ÐΞVp2p Gossip protocol peers of v;
• {m ∈ V such that P (m)} corresponds to the set of all the elements of V for which predicate P is true;
• {F (m) such thatm ∈ V and P (m)} corresponds to the set obtained by applying the function F to all
the elements of V for which predicate P is true;
• allSubSetsOf(M ) corresponds to the set of all of the subsets of M which is normally called the power
set of M . For example, allSubSetsOf({m1,m2,m3}) corresponds to the set {{}, {m1}, {m2}, {m3},
{m1,m2}, {m1,m3}, {m2,m3}, {m1,m2,m3}};
• The symbol ∗ denotes any value;
• Dark red colour denotes messages used only for modelling purposes and that do not have an immediate
one-to-one relationship with the messages of the ETH sub-protocol;
• Black colour when applied to messages denotes IBFT 2.0 specific messages not included in the current
ETH sub-protocol;
• We use the notation T : (t1, . . . , tn) to indicate a tuple (t1, . . . , tn) that we successively refer to as T ;
• pim(T ) corresponds to the m-th element of the tuple T where the first element has index 1. For example,
pi2((t1, t2, t3)) corresponds to t2.
• blockHeight(EB) is defined as the height of the Ethereum block EB ;
• For clarity of notation, we use sizeOf(M) to indicate the size of the set M , i.e sizeOf(M) ≡ ‖M‖;
• EthAddressRecover(H, signature) corresponds to the Ethereum address whose signature of the hash
H corresponds to signature;
• Each validator v stores its local blockchain in chainv;
• chainv[n] corresponds to the finalised block with height n, while chainv[n : m] corresponds to a sub-chain
including all of the finalised blocks from height n to height m included;
• chainEBv[n] corresponds to the Ethereum block included in the finalised block with height n, while
chainEBv[n : m] corresponds to a sub-chain including all of the Ethereum blocks included in the finalised
blocks from height n to height m included;
• The blockchain height is defined as the height of the last finalised block added to the blockchain;
• validators(chainv[0 : h − 1]) represents the set of authorised validators for instance h of the IBFT-
2.0-block-finalisation-protocol;
• n(chainv[0 : h− 1]) represents the number of validators for instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-
protocol, i.e. n(chainv[0 : h− 1]) ≡ sizeOf(validators(chainv[0 : h− 1])).
• The function isValidBlock(EB ,EBp) is defined to be true if and only if block EB is a valid Ethereum
block with parent EBp. For the purpose of this work, we consider that
isValidBlock(EB ,EBp) only verifies the following fields of the standard Ethereum header: paren-
tHash, stateRoot, transactionsRoot, receiptsRoot, logsBloom, number, gasLimit, gasUsed. These fields
are verified as specified in [16]. The IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) protocol implementation actually verifies also the
other fields but in a different way than specified in [16]. We do not describe how these fields are verified
as this is out of the scope of this work and does not affect our results. These details will be discussed in
a future document describing the implementation details of the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
As described by Algorithm 1, the different instances of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are started and
stopped in the same way that instances are started and stopped in the IBFT protocol. Finalised blocks are de-
livered to nodes using the standard ETH ÐΞVp2p sub-protocol. In the pseudocode we abstract the actual ETH
sub-protocol and model the reception of a finalised block FB with the reception of a 〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉
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message. No such message really exists in the implementation of the IBFT 2.0 protocol [13]. As per standard
ETH sub-protocol, a block can be received either via an unsolicited NewBlock message or via the pair of
messages GetBlockHeaders/BlockHeaders followed by the pair of messages GetBlockBodies/BlockBodies [7].
As described by the upon block at line 10, when a new finalised block is received by a node v, v executes the
following operations:
1. verifies if the finalised block received is for the next expected chain height, i.e hv;
2. if so, it verifies if the finalised block received is a valid finalised block.
3. if both verifications pass, then:
3.1. v adds the finalised block to its local blockchain;
3.2. if v is a validator for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, then v stops
that instance;
3.3. v advances the next expected block height, hv, by 1;
3.4. if v is a validator for the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance for the new value of hv, then
Algorithm 1: IBFT 2.0 protocol for IBFT node v
1: Functions:
2: Quorum(n) ≡
⌈
2n
3
⌉
3: isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB : (FBEB,FBFP : (FBFP r ,FBFP cs)), v)≡
4: sizeOf(FP cs) ≥ Quorum(nh,v) and
any cs ∈ FP cs such that:
EthAddressRecover(KEC((FBEB ,FBFP r)), cs) in validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1])
5: Initialisation:
6: chainv[0]← genesis block
7: hv ← 1
8: if v in validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then start the hv-th instance of the
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
9: Upon Blocks:
10: upon 〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB : (FBEB,FBFP )〉 in receivedMessagesv do
11: if blockHeight(FBEB) = hv then
12: if isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB), v) then
13: chainv[hv] ← FB
14: if v in validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then stop the hv-th instance of the
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
15: hv ← hv + 1
16: if v in validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then start the hv-th instance of the
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
17: end
18: end
19: upon (
〈〈PROPOSE, hm, ∗, ∗〉σ
sender
, ∗, ∗〉 in receivedMessagesv or
〈PREPARE, hm, ∗, ∗〉σ
sender
in receivedMessagesv or
〈COMMIT, hm, ∗, ∗〉σsender in receivedMessagesv or
〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, hm, ∗, ∗〉σsender , ∗〉 in receivedMessagesv
) and
hm > hv and
sender ∈ peersv and
expectedHeightv[sender] < hm
20: do
21: expectedHeightv[sender]← hm
22: send 〈GET-BLOCKS, hv, hm〉
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v starts that instance.
As described by the function isV alidF inalisationBlock(FB, v) at line 3, an IBFT 2.0 finalised block FB is
defined valid if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
• it contains at least Quorum(n) ≡
⌈
2n
3
⌉
different commit seals, where n is the number of validators for
instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, i.e. n ≡ n(chainv[0 : h − 1]);
• each commit seal corresponds to the signature of one of the validators over the Ethereum block and the
round number included in the finalisation proof.
Compared to IBFT, IBFT 2.0 adds the upon block at line 19 to address the Persistence issue identified in
Lemma 6 of [15]. All of the IBFT 2.0 specific messages (i.e Proposal, Prepare, Commit and Round-Change)
include the height of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance that they relate to. When a node v
receives one of these messages including a height hm with value ≥ than the next expected height hv, if the
sender of the message is one of the ÐΞVp2p peers of v, then v starts asking the peer for finalised blocks with
height between the v’s current height hv and the height hm included in the IBFT 2.0 message received. We
model this with the transmission of a 〈GET-BLOCKS, hv, hm〉 message and model the peer’s response to this
request as a 〈FINALISE-BLOCK,FB〉 message. As above, this is not an exact description of the real messages
sent by the implementation. It is a modelling of the ÐΞVp2p behaviour useful in this context for analysing
the protocol. expectedHeightv[v
′] represents the blockchain height that node v expects node v′ to have. In
our modelling of the protocol, we use expectedHeightv[v
′] to express that Get-Blocks messages are sent only
the first time that an IBFT 2.0 message with an height higher than hv is received.
3.1 Description of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we describe a generic h instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for a validator v as
detailed in Algorithm 2.
While significant portions of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are similar to the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol presented in Section 3 of [15], for the sake of completeness, this section describes the full IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol. However, for those portions of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol that are
identical or very similar to the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, the description is taken almost verbatim from
[15].
As with the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is organised in rounds,
starting from round 0, where validators progress to the next round once they suspect that in the current round
they will not be able to decide on the block to be included at height h of the blockchain. Both in Algorithm 2
and here, the current round for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v is
denoted by rh,v.
For each round, one of the validators is selected to play the role of block proposer. This selection is operated
by the evaluation of proposer(chainv[0 : h− 1], rh,v) where proposer(·, ·) is a deterministic function of the
chain of blocks from the genesis block until the block with height h− 1 and the current round number.
The pseudocode at lines 2 to 4 introduces the following macros:
• nh,v: number of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator
v;
• validatorsh,v: validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator
v;
• proposerh,v(rh,v): proposer for round rh,v of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-
protocol for validator v.
These macros are used both in the pseudocode and in this section to simplify the notation when describing
the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v. We use the term non-proposing
validators for round r and instance h to indicate all of the validators for round r and instance h with the
exclusion of the proposer for round r and instance h.
For the purpose of this work, we do not define the proposer selection function, but we state that it ensures
that all of the validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are selected for any
sequence of nh,v consecutive rounds. The IBFT 2.0 protocol retains the IBFT protocol capability to specify
two alternative logics for selecting the proposer for round 0:
• Sticky Proposer. The proposer for round 0 corresponds to the proposer of the block included in the
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previous finalised block;
• Round-Robin Proposer. The proposer for round 0 corresponds to the proposer of the proposer
selection sequence that comes after the proposer of the block included in the previous finalised block.
Compared to IBFT, in IBFT 2.0 there is no block locking mechanism. The safety of the protocol is guaranteed
by the round change protocol discussed below which is based on the view change protocol of PBFT [3].
As specified by the initialisation block (line 9), if v is the selected block proposer for the first round, i.e round 0,
then v multicasts a Proposal message 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, 0, KEC(PB)〉σv ,PB ,⊥〉 to all validators (including itself)
which comprises the message 〈PROPOSAL, h, 0, KEC(PB)〉σv signed by v, the proposed block PB and a Round-
Change-Certificate which for round 0 is empty, i.e. ⊥. More detail on how the Round-Change-Certificate is
assembled is provided further down in this section when discussing how validators move to a different round.
The proposed block PB is modelled here as a tuple where the first element is a standard Ethereum block and
the second element is the current round number at which the Ethereum block was created which at initialisation
is 0. KEC(·) represents the Keccak hash function. The pseudocode uses createNewProposedBlock(h, v) to
represent the creation of a new block with height h by validator v. Honest validators employee a fair transaction
selection algorithm to decide which transactions to include in the next block. The definition of such algorithm
is outside the scope of this work.
As specified by lines 31 to 32, a validator v accepts a Proposal message 〈〈PROPOSAL, hpp, rpp, H〉,PB :
(EB , rEB ), ∗〉 if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
• v is currently running the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance hpp, i.e hpp = h ;
• v is in round 0, i.e. rpp = rh,v = 0;
• the signed portion of the message, 〈PROPOSAL, hpp, rpp, H〉, is signed by the selected proposer for round
rh,v = 0 and instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol;
• v has not already accepted a Proposal message for round rh,v = 0 in the h-th instance of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol, i.e acceptedPB = ⊥;
• the Ethereum block EB included in the proposed block PB is a valid block for height h;
• the round number included in the prepared block PB matches the current round number, i.e. rh,v =
rEB = 0;
• H corresponds to the Keccak hash of the proposed block PB .
When a validator v accepts a Proposal message:
• it marks the Proposal message as accepted by setting the state variable acceptedPB to the proposed
block included in the Proposal message (line 16);
• it multicasts a Prepare message 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, H〉σv (see line 17) to all validators (including itself).
The upon block at line 36 is executed the first time that all of the following conditions are met by validator v:
• v has accepted a Proposal message for the proposed block PB , i.e. acceptedPBh,v = PB ;
• v has received, from non-proposing validators for the current round, at least Quorum(nh,v)− 1 Prepare
messages for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, current round and with
digest H corresponding to the Keccak hash of the accepted proposed block PB .
When all of the conditions listed above are met for the first time, then:
• v multicasts a Commit message 〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, H,CS(PB , v)〉σv to all validators (including itself),
where CS(PB , v), called commit seal, corresponds to the signature of v over the proposed block PB and
the current round number;
• v sets latestPreparedProposedBlockh,v to the proposed block PB ;
• v sets latestPCh,v to a set including the signed portion of the accepted Proposal message and all of the
Prepare messages sent by non-proposing validators for the current round targeting the current instance of
the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, current round and with digest H corresponding to the Keccak
hash of the accepted proposed block PB .
The pseudocode uses the state variable commitSenth,v to indicate that the Commit message is sent only the
first time that all of the conditions listed above are met. Indeed, commitSenth,v is set to true at line 39 and
reset to false in the StartNewRound procedure at line 26. By borrowing from the PBFT terminology, when
a validator meets the conditions indicated in the upon block at line 36, then v is said to be prepared at round
rh,v. By borrowing again from the PBFT terminology, latestPCh,v is called latest Prepared-Certificate and
the protocol is designed so that latestPCh,v always holds at least the minimum number of messages required
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to prove that v prepared in round rh,v on a proposed block with Keccak hash H . We say that a Prepared-
Certificate is for round r and instance h if and only if the Prepared-Certificate only includes signed Proposal
and Prepare messages for round r and height h. latestPCh,v always holds the Prepared-Certificate for latest
round in the current instance h where v is prepared . latestPCh,v = ⊥ only if v has never prepared in the
current instance h.
The upon block at line 44 is executed the first time that all of the following conditions are met by validator v:
• v has accepted a Proposal message for the proposed block PB , i.e. acceptedPBh,v = PB ;
• v has received, from at least different Quorum(nh,v) validators for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol, a Commit message for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-
protocol, current round, with digest H corresponding to the Keccak hash of the accepted proposed block
PB and commit seal signed by the sender of the Commit message.
When all of the conditions listed above are met for the first time, then:
• v creates a block finalisation proof modelled as a tuple comprising the current round number and the
commit seals included in all the Commit messages that satisfy the condition on Commit messages stated
above;
• v creates a finalised block modelled as a tuple comprising the Ethereum block included in the proposed
block and the finalisation proof;
• v broadcasts the finalised block to all nodes;
The pseudocode uses the state variable finalisedBlockSenth,v to trigger the transmission of a finalised block
only the first time that the conditions listed above are met. finalisedBlockSenth,v is set at line 50 and reset
in the StartNewRound procedure at line 12.
In alignment with PBFT, IBFT 2.0 relies on a round change sub-protocol to detect whether the selected
proposer may be Byzantine and causing the protocol to never terminate. As specified at lines 21 to 22,
whenever a validator v starts a new round, it starts a round timer with duration exponential to the round
number (see line 8).
When validator v’s round timer for the current round expires (line 51), v starts the round rh,v + 1 and
multicasts a 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rh,v + 1, latestPCh,v〉, latestPreparedProposedBlockh,v〉 message for the
new round to all validators (including itself). As it can be noted, the Round-Change message includes the
latest Prepared-Certificate and the proposed block associated with the latest Prepared Certificate.
The upon block at line 55 describes under which conditions a Proposal message for a new round is multicast
and how the Proposal message is assembled. Specifically, the upon block is executed only if v has received at
least Quorum(nh,v) Round-Change message for the current IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance such
that:
• all messages are for the same round number rrc and rrc is higher than the current round;
• all messages are sent by distinct validators for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-
protocol;
• all messages contain a valid Prepared-Certificate;
A Prepared-Certificate is considered valid either if it is empty (⊥) or if it contains one Proposal message
and at least Quorum(nh,v)− 1 Prepare messages for the same round r
′ such that:
– r′ < than the the round number of the Round-Change messages, rrc;
– the Proposal message is signed by the selected proposer for round r′;
– the Prepare messages are sent by non-proposing validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol and round r′ and they are all for the current instance h of the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol, round r′ and same hash as the one included in the Proposal message.
• the Keccak hash of the proposedBlock included in each of the Round-Change messages considered
matches the hash included in the Proposal and Prepare message of the Prepared-Certificate.
We say that any set meeting these conditions is a valid Round-Change-Certificate for round r′ where round r′
is the round included in all of the Round-Change messages included in the Round-Change-Certificate. When
all of the conditions listed above are met, then:
• v moves to the round number included in one of the Round-Change-Certificates with the highest round
number, let RCC be the chosen Round-Change-Certificate and let rh be the round number of RCC;
• if v was not already in rh, then v starts the round timer for round rh;
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• if v is the selected proposer for round rh, then v sends a Proposal message for the new round including
the selected Round-Change-Certificate (RCC) and a proposed block calculated as follows:
– if all of the Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change message are empty, i.e = ⊥, then
the proposed block must be a tuple including any valid Ethereum block for height h and the current
round number, which must match the round number of the Proposal message;
– otherwise, the Ethereum block included in the tuple constituting the proposed block must match
the proposed block received as part of one of the Round-Change messages including a Prepared-
Certificate for the highest round amongst the rounds of all the other Prepared-Certificates included
in the Round-Change-Certificate.
As specified by the upon block at line 71, a Proposal message 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rpp, H〉σsender ,PB , RCC〉 for
a round higher than 0 is accepted only if all of the following conditions are met:
• v is currently running the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance hpp, i.e hpp = h ;
• the round number rpp of the Proposal message is either higher than the current round or equal to
the current round provided that v has not accepted any Proposal message for the current round (i.e
acceptedPB = ⊥;);
• H corresponds to the Keccak hash of the proposed block PB .
• the signed portion of the message is signed by the selected proposer for round rpp and instance h of the
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol;
• the Round-Change-Certificate RCC includes at least Quorum(nh,v) Round-Change messages for round
rpp and height h;
• if each of the Round-Change messages included in the Round-Change-Certificate RCC includes either
an invalid Prepared-Certificate or an empty Prepared-Certificate, then
– the Ethereum block EB included in the proposed block PB must be a valid block for height h;
– the round number rEB included in the prepared block PB must match the current round number,
i.e. rh,v = rEB ;
• otherwise, the Keccak hash of the tuple composed of the Ethereum block included in PB and the highest
round number of all Prepared-Certificated included in RCC must match the hash included in any of the
messages that are part of the Prepared-Certificates with the highest round number amongst all of the
Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change-Certificate RCC.
The effect of accepting a Proposal message for a round rpp > 0 is essentially the same effect of accepting the
Proposal message for round 0 with the addition of moving to round rpp , namely:
• v moves to round rpp and start related round timer if v was not already in round rpp;
• v multicasts a Prepare message 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, H〉σv to all validators (including itself);
• v sets acceptedPBh,v to the proposed block PB indicating that it accepted a Proposal message for PB .
From here on the protocol proceeds as described above.
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Algorithm 2: h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v.
1: Macro Expansions:
2: nh,v expands to: n(chainv[0 : h − 1])
3: validatorsh,v expands to: validators(chainv[0 : h − 1])
4: proposerh,v(rh,v) expands to: proposer(chainv[0 : h− 1], rh,v)
5: Functions:
6: CS(PB , v) ≡ sign(KEC(PB), vprivKey)
7: validPC(PC, rlimit , h, v) ≡

true if PC = ⊥ or
(
/* PC contains at least Quorum(nh,v) messages */
sizeOf(PC) ≥ Quorum(nh,v) and
/* PC contains one and only one Proposal message */
sizeOf({m ∈ PC such thatm = 〈PROPOSAL, h, ∗, ∗〉σ∗})=1 and
/* the other messages in PC are all Prepare messages */
sizeOf({m ∈ PC such thatm = 〈PREPARE, h, ∗, ∗〉σ∗})= sizeOf(PC)− 1
/* all the messages in PC are sent by different senders */
any 〈m′〉σsender′ , 〈m
′′〉σsender′′ in PC is such thatm
′ 6= m′′ implies sender′ 6= sender′′ and
/* all the messages in PC are for the same round and proposed block hash */
any 〈*, h, r′, H ′〉σ∗ , 〈*, h, r
′′, H ′′〉σ∗ in PC is such that r
′ = r′′ and H ′ = H ′′ and
/* the round included in all the messages in PC is lower than rlimit */
any 〈*, h, r′, ∗〉σ∗ in PC is such that r
′ < rlimit and
/* Proposal messages in PC are sent by the proposer for the round included in
the Proposal message, whereas Prepare messages are sent by any non-proposing
validator for the round included in the Prepare messsages */
(
anym in PC is such that
m = 〈PROPOSAL, h, r′, ∗〉σsender and sender = proposer(r
′) or
m = 〈PREPARE, h, r′, ∗〉σsender and sender in (validatorsh,v excluding proposer(r
′))
)
)
false otherwise
8: RoundT imerT imeout(r) ≡ timeoutForRoundZero · 2r
9: Initialisation:
10: latestPCh,v ← ⊥
11: latestPreparedProposedBlockh,v ← ⊥
12: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← false
13: StartNewRound(0, h, v)
14: if v = proposer(0) then
15: let PB ≡ (createNewProposedBlock(h, v), 0)
16: acceptedPBh,v ← PB
17: multicast 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rh,v, KEC(PB)〉σv ,PB ,⊥〉 to validatorsh,v
18: end
19: Procedures:
20: def StartNewRound(r, h, v):
21: if r = 0 or r > rh,v then
22: set roundT imerh,v[r] to expire after RoundT imerT imeout(r)
23: end
24: rh,v ← r
25: acceptedProposedPBh,v ← ⊥
26: commitSenth,v ← false
27: def StartNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(r, h, v):
28: StartNewRound(r, h, v)
/* rh,v = r from this point on */
29: multicast 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rh,v, latestPCh,v〉σv , latestPreparedProposedBlockh,v〉 to validatorsh,v
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Algorithm 2: h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v (continue).
30: Upon Blocks:
/* reception of PROPOSAL messages for round 0 */
31: upon acceptedPBh,v = ⊥ and
(there exists 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rp, H〉σsender ,PB : (EB, rEB),⊥〉 in receivedMessagesv such that :
sender = proposerh,v(rh,v) and
H = KEC(PB) and
rp = rh,v = rEB = 0 and
isValidBlock(EB , chainEBv[h− 1])
) and
v 6= proposerh,v(0) do
32: acceptedPBh,v ← PB
33: multicast 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, H〉σv to validatorsh,v
/* reception of PREPARE messages */
34: validPrepareMessages(h, v)≡
35: {〈PREPARE, h, rc, H〉σ
sender
in receivedMessagesv such that
sender in validatorsh,v and
rc = rh,v and
H = KEC(acceptedPBh,v)}
36: upon acceptedPBh,v 6= ⊥ and
sizeOf(validPrepareMessages(h, v)) ≥ Quorum(nh,v)− 1 and
commitSenth,v = false do
37: let PB ≡ acceptedPBh,v
38: multicast 〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(PB),CS(PB , v)〉σv to validatorsh,v
39: commitSenth,v ← true
/* latestPCh,v is set to a set including the signed portion of the accepted Proposal message
and all the valid Prepare messages received */
40: latestPCh,v ← {〈PROPOSAL, h, rh,v, KEC(PB)〉σproposerh,v(rh,v) such that
there exists 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rh,v, KEC(PB)〉σproposerh,v(rh,v) , ∗, ∗〉 in receivedMessagesv}
union with validPrepareMessages(h, v)
41: latestPreparedProposedBlockh,v ← PB
/* reception of COMMIT messages */
42: validCommitMessages(h, v)≡
43: {〈COMMIT, h, rc, H, cs〉σsender in receivedMessagesv such that
sender in validatorsh,v and
rc = rh,v and
H = KEC(acceptedPBh,v) and
EthAddressRecover(KEC(acceptedPBh,v), cs) = sender}
44: upon acceptedPBh,v 6= ⊥ and
sizeOf(validCommitMessages(h, v)) ≥ Quorum(nh,v) and
finalisedBlockSenth,v = false do
45: letcommitSeals ≡
{cs such that:
there exists 〈COMMIT, h, ∗, ∗, cs〉σ∗ in validCommitMessages(h, v)}
46: let finalisationProofh,v ≡ (rh,v, commitSeals)
47: let EB ≡ pi1(acceptedPBh,v)
48: let FB ≡ (EB , f inalisationProofh,v)
49: broadcast 〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉 to all nodes
50: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← true
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Algorithm 2: h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v (continue).
/* round timer expiry */
51: upon expiry of roundT imerh,v [rh,v] do
52: StartNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
/* reception of ROUND-CHANGE messages */
53: setsOfV alidRoundChangeCertificates(h, v)≡
54: {RCC in allSubSetsOf(receivedMessagesv) such that:
sizeOf(RCC) = Quorum(nh,v) and
/* all messages in RCC are Round-Change messages for instance h */
any mRCC in RCC is such that mRCC = 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, ∗, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉 and
/* all messages in RCC are sent by different senders */
any 〈〈m1〉σsender , ∗〉, 〈〈m2〉σsender′ , ∗〉 in RCC is such that m1 6= m2 implies sender 6= sender
′ and
/* all messages in RCC are for the same round */
any 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, r′, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉, 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, r
′′, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉 in RCC is such that r
′ = r′′ and
/* any message in RCC is such that: */
any 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rrc, PC〉σ
sender
,PB〉 in RCC is such that:
/* the sender is one of the validators */
sender in validatorsh and
/* the round number of the Round-Change message is either higher than the current round number
or equal to the current round number provided that no Proposal message for the round included
in the Round-Change message has alrady been accepted */
(rrc > rh,v or (rrc = rh,v and acceptedPB = ⊥)) and
/* the Prepared-Certificate is valid */
validPC(PC, rrc, h, v) and
/* the block hash included in all of the messages included in the Prepared
certificate corresponds to the hash of the proposed block included in the
Round-Change message */
any mPC in PC is such that:
mPC = 〈PROPOSAL, ∗, ∗, KEC(PB)〉 or mPC = 〈PREPARE, ∗, ∗, KEC(PB)〉}
55: upon sizeOf(setsOfV alidRoundChangeCertificates(h, v)) ≥ 1 do
/* let extendedRCC be any valid Round-Change-Certificate for the highest round number */
56: let extendedRCC ≡
choose any set in
{eRCC in setsOfValidRoundChangeCertificates (h, v) such that:
any 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, r, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉 in eRCC is such that: :
r = max({r′ such that there exists 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, r′, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉 in extendedRCC})
/* let rrc be the round number of the Round-Change certficate in extendedRCC */
57: let rrc ≡ choose any in {r such that 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, r, ∗〉σ∗ , ∗〉 in extendedRCC}
58: StartNewRound(rrc, h, v)
/* rh,v = rrc from this point on */
59: if v = proposer(rrc) then
/* let roundsAndPreparedBlocks be a set of all tuples where the the first element is the proposed block
included in the Round-Change messages in extendedRCC including a non-empty Prepared-Certificate and
the second element is the round number of those Prepared-Certificates */
60: let roundsAndPreparedBlocks ≡ {(EB , r) such that:
there exists 〈〈ROUND-CHANGE, ∗, ∗, PC〉σ∗ ,PB〉 in extendedRCC such that:
PB 6= ⊥ and PB = (EB , ∗) and
PC 6= ⊥ and any m in PC is such that m = 〈*, ∗, r, ∗〉}
61: if roundsAndPreparedBlocks = {} then
/* If all of Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change messages included in extendedRCC
are empty, then the Ethereum block included in the proposed block must be any valid Ethereum
block for height h */
62: letEB ≡ createNewProposedBlock(h, v)
63: else
/* If at least one of the Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change messages included in
extendedRCC is not empty, then the Ethereum block included in the proposed block must match the
Ethereum block included in the Prepared-Certificate with the highest round number */
64: letEB ≡ choose any in
{EB such that
(EB , r) in roundsAndPreparedBlocks and
r = max({r′ such that (∗, r′) in roundsAndPreparedBlocks})}
65: end
/* The proposed block is modelled as a tuple where the first element is the proposed Ethereum block and
the second element is the current round */
66: let PB ≡ (EB , rh,v)
/* letRCC be the signed portion of the Round-Change messages included in extendedRCC */
67: letRCC ≡ {〈RC〉σsender such that 〈〈RC〉σsender , ∗〉 in extendedRCC }
68: multicast 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rh,v, KEC(PB)〉σv ,PB ,RCC 〉 to validatorsh,v
69: acceptedPBh,v ← PB
70: end
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Algorithm 2: h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v (continue).
/* reception of PROPOSAL messages for rounds higher than 0 */
71: upon there exists 〈〈PROPOSAL, h, rpp, H〉σ
sender
,PB : (EB, rEB),RCC 〉 in receivedMessagesv such that:
sender = proposer(rpp) and
H = KEC(PB) and
/* the round number of the Proposal message is either higher than the current round
number or equal to the current round number provided that no Proposal message for
the round included in the Round-Change message has alrady been accepted */
(rpp > rh,v or (rpp = rh,v and acceptedPBh,v = ⊥)) and
/* the Round-Change-Certificate contains at least Quorum(nh,v) messages */
sizeOf(RCC) ≥ Quorum(nh,v) and
/* any message in RCC is a Round-Change message for height h and round equal to the
round of the Proposal message sent by a validator */
anym in RCC is such that
m = 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rpp, ∗〉σ
sender′
and
sender′ in validatorsh,v and
/* any message in RCC is signed by a different validator */
any 〈m1〉σsender′ , 〈m2〉σsender′′ in RCC is such thatm1 6= m2 implies sender
′ 6= sender′′ and
v 6= proposer(rpp) do
/* let roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes be the set of all tuples where the the first element is the
block hash included in non-empty and valid Prepared-Certificates included in each of the
Round-Change messages in RCC and the second element is the round number of those
Prepared-Certificates */
72: let roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes ≡ {(H, r) such that:
there exists 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rpp, PC〉σ∗ in RCC such that:
PC 6= ⊥ and
validPC(PC, rpp, h, v) and
anym in PC is such thatm = 〈*, ∗, r,H〉}
73: if roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes 6= {} then
/* If at least one of the Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change messages in RCC
is non-empty and valid then let maxR be the round number of the Prepared-Certificates
included in the Round-Change messsages in RCC with the highest round number and let
exptectedH be the block hash included in the Prepared-Certificates with the highest round
number */
74: letmaxR ≡ max({r′ such that (∗, r′) in roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes})
75: let expectedH ≡ choose any in
{H such that
(H, r) in roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes and
r = maxR}
76: end
77: if /* there is no a valid and non-empty Prepared-Certificate included in the Round-Change
messages in RCC and the Ethereum block included in the proposed block is a valid Ethereum
block for height h */
78: (roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes = {} and isValidBlock(EB , chainEBv[h− 1])) or
/* the hash of the tuple composed of the Ethereum block included in the proposed block and
the highest round number of the Prepapred-Certificates included in the Round-Change messages
in RCC matches the expected hash */
79: (roundsAndPreparedBlockHashes 6= {} and KEC((EB ,maxR)) = expectedH) then
80: StartNewRound(rpp, h, v)
/* rh,v = rpp from this point on */
81: acceptedPBh,v ← PB
82: multicast 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, H〉σv to validatorsh,v
83: end
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4 Robustness Analysis
In this section we show that the IBFT 2.0 protocol is robust when operating in an eventually synchronous
network.
As such the eventually synchronous network model assumption is assumed throughout this analysis.
4.1 Definitions
In this section we provide a few definitions that will be used in the following sections to draw the robustness
analysis of the IBFT 2.0 protocol to conclusion. Most of these definitions were first introduced in [15] and are
re-stated here for completeness.
t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence.). The IBFT 2.0 protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-
tolerant Persistence if and only if the following statement is true: provided that no more than t validators are
Byzantine, the IBFT protocol guarantees the Persistence property defined in Definition 1.
In the context of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, Safety is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety for the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol). The IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety if and only if it guarantees the validity of
the following statement: in the presence of no more than t Byzantine validators, the protocol ensures that no
two valid finalised blocks including different Ethereum blocks for the same height can ever be produced.
In relation to the Safety property of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, we define Byzantine-fault-
tolerant Safety threshold as follows.
Definition 4 (Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety threshold). Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety threshold for a pro-
tocol that guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety is defined as the maximum number of Byzantine nodes
that the protocol can withstand while ensuring Safety, i.e. t.
The following two definitions are related to the Liveness property of the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
Definition 5 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Liveness). The IBFT 2.0 protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant
Liveness if and only if the following statement is true: provided that no more than t validators are Byzantine,
the IBFT 2.0 protocol guarantees the Liveness property defined in Definition 1.
Definition 6 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol). The
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness if and only if, pro-
vided that no more than t validators are Byzantine, it guarantees that for any h instance of the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol at least one valid finalised block for height h will eventually be produced.
In relation to the Weak-Liveness property of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, we define Byzantine-
fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness threshold as follows:
Definition 7 (Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness threshold). Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness
threshold for a protocol that guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness is defined as the maximum
number of Byzantine nodes that the protocol can withstand while ensuring Weak-Liveness, i.e. t.
As proved in Dwork et al. [5], when the network communication is eventually synchronous, consensus is
deterministically possible in a network of n nodes participating in the consensus protocol if and only if no
more than f(n) ≡
⌊
n−1
3
⌋
of these nodes are Byzantine. The following definitions of optimal Byzantine-fault-
tolerant Safety, Persistence, Weak-Liveness and Liveness follow directly from this known lower limit.
Definition 8 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety threshold for the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
). The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety threshold pro-
vided that for any instance h its Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety threshold corresponds to f(nh) where nh is
the number of validators for the h-th instance of IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
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Definition 9 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence threshold for the IBFT protocol ). The IBFT
2.0 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence threshold if and only if it guarantees the
Persistence property defined in Definition 1 despite up to f(nh) validators being Byzantine for any instance
h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol where nh is the number of validators for the h-th instance of
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Definition 10 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerantWeak-Liveness threshold for the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
). The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerantWeak-Liveness thresh-
old provided that for any instance h its Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness threshold corresponds to f(nh)
where nh is the number of validators for the h-th instance of IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Definition 11 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence threshold for the IBFT protocol ). The IBFT
2.0 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Liveness threshold if and only if it guarantees the
Liveness property defined in Definition 1 despite up to f(nh) validators being Byzantine for any instance
h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol where nh is the number of validators for the h-th instance of
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol..
4.2 Safety Analysis of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we prove that the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol provides optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant
Safety.
We use the inductive assumption used by Lemma 3 in [15], which states that the local blockchains of all honest
nodes are identical until finalised block with height h − 1. Therefore, since the set of validators for the h-th
instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is a function of the local blockchain until the block with
height h− 1, this set is identical amongst all honest validators. We denote the total number of validators for
the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol with nh.
We also assume that for any instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, no more than f(nh)
validators are Byzantine.
Lemma 1. The intersection of any two sets of Quorum(nh) validators includes an honest validator.
Proof. See Lemma 23 of [15].
Lemma 2. The intersection of any set of Quorum(nh)− f(nh) honest validators with any set of Quorum(nh)
validators includes an honest validator.
Proof. Obvious as the intersection of any two sets of Quorum(nh) validators includes an honest validator and
any set of Quorum(nh) validators is guaranteed to include at least Quorum(nh)− f(nh) honest validators.
Lemma 3. An honest validator sends either one and only one Proposal or one and only one Prepare message
for a round r.
Proof. This is obvious from the pseudocode.
Corollary 3.1. An honest validator never sends two Proposal or Prepare messages for the same round r with
different block hashes.
Lemma 4. For each round r, if two honest validators send a Commit message, then the block hashes included
in the two Commit messages are the same.
Proof. Assume that the Lemma is false. This implies that two honest validators send two Commit messages
including different block hashes. This, in turn, implies that each validator received at least Quorum(nh)
messages (one Proposal message and Quorum(nh) − 1 Prepare messages) for each of the two different block
hashes. Since two sets of size Quorum(nh) validators always intersect in an honest validator, this implies that
one honest validator sent a Proposal or Prepare message for one of the block hashes and a Proposal or Prepare
message for the other block hash. This is a contradiction as Lemma 3 and Corollary 3.1 show that an honest
validator never sends two different Prepare messages or two different Proposal messages and it sends either a
Prepare message or a Proposal message for a given round, but never both.
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Lemma 5. No two Prepared-Certificates for the same round and for different block hashes can be created.
Proof. By, contradiction assume that the Lemma is false and two Prepared-Certificates, say PC and PC′ are
created for the same round r but for different block hashes, say H and H ′ respectively. Since (i) a Prepared-
Certificate includes at least Quorum(nh)messages (between one Proposal message and Quorum(nh)−1 Prepare
messages) and (ii) according to Lemma 1 any two sets of Quorum(nh) validators are guaranteed to intersect
in at least one honest validator, this implies that at least one honest validator sent a Proposal or Prepare
message for round r and block hash H and a Proposal or Prepare message for round r and block hash H ′.
This is in contradiction with Lemma 3 and Corollary 3.1.
Lemma 6. If an honest validator v creates a valid finalised block for the Ethereum block EB while in round r,
then the proposed block included in any valid Proposal message sent after round r includes the same Ethereum
block EB .
Proof. If an honest validator v creates a valid finalised block including the Ethereum block EB while in round
r, then at least Quorum(nh)−f(nh) honest validators must have sent a valid Commit message for round r and
the same block hash H = KEC((EB , r)). This, in turn, implies that all of these Quorum(nh) − f(nh) honest
validators have set their respective latestPC variable to a Prepared-Certificate for block hash H at round r.
The proof is by induction on the round number. For the base case we show that the Lemma holds for any
valid Proposal message sent for round r + 1. Since any valid Proposal message includes Quorum(nh) Round-
Change messages, Lemma 2 implies that at least one of these contains a Prepared-Certificate sent by an honest
validator, say v′, that also sent a valid Commit message for block hash H at round r. Since v′ sent a Commit
message for block hash H at round r, v′ must have included a valid Prepared-Certificate for round r and block
hash H in its Round-Change message. Since valid Round-Change messages for round r + 1 can only contain
Prepared-Certificates for round number up to r, and according to Lemma 5 no two valid Prepared-Certificates
for the same round can be created, a valid Proposal message for round r + 1 must include a proposed block
including an Ethereum block EB ′ such that KEC((r,EB ′)) = H . This together with our assumption on the
uniqueness property of the Keccak function imply that EB ′ = EB .
For the inductive step, we assume that the Lemma is valid for r′ > r, and then show that the Lemma is
also valid for r′′ = r′ + 1. Consider that based on our inductive assumption, for any round r′′′ such that
r < r′′′ ≤ r′, if a valid Proposal message is sent then this message includes a proposed block including
EB . This implies that if any honest validator created a Prepared-Certificate while in any round r′′′, then
this Prepared-Certificate must be for hash KEC((r′′′,EB)) as honest validators only include valid Proposal
message in their Prepared-Certificates. Now consider that since any valid Proposal message for rounds higher
than 0 includes Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages, Lemma 2 implies that at least one of these contains
a Prepared-Certificate sent by an honest-validator, say v′, that also sent a valid Commit message for hash
KEC((r,EB)) and round r. If this is the Prepared-Certificate with the highest round number that is included
in the Round-Change-Certificate included in the Proposal message for round r′′ then the Lemma is proved. If
not, our consideration above and Lemma 5 imply that any valid Prepared-Certificate for any round r′′′, with
r < r′′′ ≤ r′, is for hash KEC((r′′′,EB)). This and our assumption on the uniqueness property of the Keccak
hash function complete the proof.
Lemma 7. If a valid finalised block including the Ethereum block EB is created in round r, then any other
finalised block created at the same round or later round includes the same Ethereum block EB .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Hence, we assume that a finalised block including an Ethereum block
EB
′, with EB 6= EB ′, is produced at round r′ ≥ r. Lemma 1 implies that an honest validator, say v, sent both
a Commit message for hash KEC((r,EB)) and round r and a Commit message for block hash KEC((r′,EB ′))
and round r′. However, according to Lemma 6, only block EB can be proposed in a valid Proposal message
for round r′. Hence, since honest validators only send Commit messages matching valid Proposal messages,
this implies that v can only send Commit messages for block hash KEC((r′′,EB)) for any round r′′ ≥ r which
leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 1. The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol achieves optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance threshold.
Proof. It is an obvious consequence of Lemma 7 that no two valid finalised blocks including two different
Ethereum blocks can be produced by the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
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4.3 Weak-Liveness Analysis of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we show that the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol ensures optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant
Weak-Liveness. We analyse the generic h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol and, as in the
Section above, we assume that, for any instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, no more than
f(nh) validators are Byzantine.
Lemma 8. Honest validators running the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol move to a
round higher than the current one when one of the following events occurs:
• the round timer for the current round expires;
• they receive Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages for a round higher than the current one sent by distinct
validators;
• they receive a valid Proposal message for a round higher than the current one.
Proof. Obvious from the pseudocode.
Lemma 9. If validator v starts round r at time t, then v will move to a round r′ > r by the time t +
RoundT imerT imeout(r).
Proof. Obvious from the following properties deductible from the pseudocode:
• on the expiry of the round timer for the current round, honest validators move to a higher round;
• the round timer for the current round is never restarted;
• validator v never moves to a round lower than the current round.
Let srh,v(r) denote the time at which validator v starts round r of instance h.
Lemma 10. Let vf be the first honest validator of instance h to start instance h. The following relation is
verified for any honest validator v of instance h and round r such that both vf and v start round r at some
point while in instance h:
srh,vf (r) ≤ srh,v(r)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the round number. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case
(r = 0) as we assume that v starts instance h before any other validator.
For the inductive case, we show by contradiction that if Lemma holds for r′ then it also holds for r = r′ + 1.
Assume that the Lemma holds for r′, but not for r. Since
(i) vf started round r
′ no later than when v started round r′,
(ii) the length of the round timer for round r′ is identical between vf and v,
(iii) validators move to a higher round either if the round timer for the current round expires, they receive
Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages, sent by distinct validators, for a round higher than the current
one or if they receive a valid Proposal message with round number higher than the current one,
the assumption that v moves to r before vf does implies that v received either Quorum(nh) Round-Change
messages, sent by distinct validators, for round r or a valid Proposal message for round r before vf moves to
round r. This, in turn, implies that at least one honest validator different from v, say v′, sent a Round-Change
message for round r, as at least one of the Round-Change messages received or included in the Proposal
message has been sent by an honest validator. This implies that v′’s round timer for round r′ expired before
the vf ’s round timer for round r
′. This is in clear contradiction with conditions (i) and (ii) above.
Let nonForcedRoundStarth,v(r) denote the time at which round r (and its related round timer) is started if
v has moved to a higher round in each round < r only as effect of the round timer expiry.
Lemma 11. Let vf be the first honest validator of instance h to start instance h. The following condition is
always verified:
nonForcedRoundStarth,vf (r) = srh,vf (r)
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Proof. The proof is by induction. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case r = 0.
For the inductive case, we show by contradiction that if Lemma holds for r′ then it also holds for r = r′ + 1.
Case 1: nonForcedRoundStarth,vf (r) > srh,vf (r). This and Lemma 8 imply that vf receives either
Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages, sent by distinct validators, for round r or a valid Proposal message
for round r before the expiry of the round timer for round r′. For this to happen, as argued in the proof of
Lemma 10, there must exist an honest validator different from vf , say v, that sends a Round-Change message
for round r, and therefore starts round r before vf moves to round r. This is in contradiction with Lemma 10.
Case 2: nonForcedRoundStarth,vf (r) < srh,vf (r). This implies that round r is started after the expiry of
round time for round r′. This is in contradiction with Lemma 9.
Lemma 12. Let vℓ be the last honest validator to start instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
The following relation is verified for any honest validator v of instance h and round r such that both vℓ and v
start round r at some point while in instance h:
nonForcedRoundStarth,vℓ(r) ≥ srh,v(r)
Proof. The proof is by induction. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case r = 0 as we assume that
vℓ is the last honest validator to start instance h, and therefore round 0.
For the inductive case, we show by contradiction that if Lemma holds for r′ then it also holds for r = r′ + 1.
Assume that there exists a validator v′ for which nonForcedRoundStarth,vℓ(r) < srh,v′(r). Since the Lemma is
verified for r′, this implies that v′ started round r after srh,v′(r
′)+timeoutForRoundZero(r′) which contradicts
Lemma 9.
Let sih,v be the time at which validator v starts the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Lemma 13. The following equation holds for any validator v of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-
finalisation-protocol provided that validator v starts round r at some point while in instance h.
nonForcedRoundStarth,v(r) ≡ sih,v + timeoutForRoundZero · (2
r − 1)
Proof.
nonForcedRoundStarth,v(r) ≡ sih,v +
r−1∑
i=0
timeoutForRoundZero · 2i
≡ sih,v + timeoutForRoundZero · (2
r − 1)
To be noted that nonForcedRoundStarth,v(0) correctly corresponds to sih,v
Lemma 14. Let vf be the first honest validator of instance h to start round r, vℓ be the last honest validator of
instance h to start round r. minT imeAllHonestV alidatorsAreInTheSameRound(r), representing the length
of the minimum time segment where all honest validators that started instance h are in round r at the same
time, is expressed as follows:
minT imeAllHonestV alidatorsAreInTheSameRound(r) ≡ max(sih,vf−sih,vℓ+timeoutForRoundZero·2
r, 0)
Proof. It is obvious from Lemmas 10 to 12 that minT imeAllHonestV alidatorsAreInTheSameRound(r) ≡
max(nonForcedRoundStarth,vf (r + 1)− nonForcedRoundStarth,vℓ(r), 0).
The following series of equivalences proves the Lemma:
nonForcedRoundStarth,vf (r + 1)− nonForcedRoundStarth,vℓ(r)
≡ sih,vf · timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r+1 − (sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r)
≡ sih,vf − sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · (2
r+1 − 2r)
≡ sih,vf − sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r
To be noted that sih,vℓ ≥ sih,vf .
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Lemma 15. The following inequality is verified for any n ≥ 0:
Quorum(n) + f(n) ≤ n
Proof. See Lemma 24 of [15].
Lemma 16. Let ∆ be the maximum message delay after GST. Let r be a round such that:
• at least Quorum(nh) honest validators start round r after GST;
• the proposer of round r is honest;
• sih,vf − sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r ≥ 4 ·∆
where vf is the first honest validator to start instance h and vℓ is the last honest validator of a group of
Quorum(nh) honest validators to start instance h.
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is guaranteed to produce a valid finalised block at round r.
Proof. sih,vf − sih,vℓ +timeoutForRoundZero·2
r ≥ 4 ·∆ implies that all of the Quorum(nh) honest validators
are in round r for at least 4 ·∆ time. Let vℓ,r be the latest honest validator, of a group of Quorum(nh) honest
validators, to start round r. The following sequence of events that leads to the creation of a valid finalised
block completes in no more than 4 ·∆ time.
1. vℓ,r sends a Round-Change message for round r at time t. All other validators have already sent a
Round-Change message for round r.
2. By time t+∆ the proposer for round r, pr, which is honest by assumption, receives at least Quorum(nh)
Round-Change messages for round r. pr then sends a Proposal message for round r.
3. By time t+2 ·∆ all honest validators receive the Proposal message and therefore send a Prepare message
for the block included in the Proposal message.
4. By time t+ 3 ·∆ all honest validators receive the Quorum(nh)− 1 Prepare messages sent by all honest
validators (except for the proposer) and therefore send a Commit message matching the Prepare and
Proposal messages received.
5. By time t+ 4 ·∆ all honest validators receive the Quorum(nh) Commit messages for round r which are
sufficient to create a valid finalised block.
Lemma 17. For any instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol there eventually exists a round r
that meets the conditions listed in Lemma 16:
• at least Quorum(nh) honest validators start round r sometime after GST;
• the proposer of round r is honest;
• sih,vf − sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r ≥ 4 ·∆
where vf is the first honest validator to start instance h and vℓ is the last honest validator of a group of
Quorum(nh) honest validators to start instance h.
Proof. Let rafterGST be the first round of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol that
Quorum(nh) honest validator start after GST.
Let synchronousRound(r) be the condition sih,vf − sih,vℓ + timeoutForRoundZero · 2
r ≥ 4 · ∆ with r ≥
rafterGST .
Since
(i) GST eventually occurs;
(ii) ∆ is a constant;
(iii) in no longer than RoundT imerT imeout(rh,v) time from starting the current round rh,v, any honest
validator v moves to a round number higher than the current one except if it can create a valid finalised
block in the current round;
(iv) if honest validators move to a round, then the new round is higher than the current round;
(v) Lemma 15 guarantees that there exist at least Quorum(nh) honest validators;
(vi) 2x is a strictly monotonically increasing function.
the condition synchronousRound(r) will eventually be met for a round r. Let rfirstSynch be the smaller round
number of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for which condition
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synchronousRound(rfirstSynch) is true. Since the propose function guarantees to select all honest valida-
tors of the current IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance for any sequence of nh,v rounds, there ex-
ists a round r ≥ rfirstSynch where the proposer is honest. Let rfirstHonestAfterSynch be the first round
where the proposer is honest such that rfirstHonestAfterSynch ≥ rfirstSynch. Since 2
x is a strictly mono-
tonically increasing function, if the condition synchronousRound(rfirstSynch) is true, then the condition
synchronousRound(rfirstHonestAfterSynch) is true as well. Also, statements (iii), (iv) and (v) above imply
that at least Quorum(nh) honest validators start round rfirstHonestAfterSynch at some point while instance h
except if a finalised block for height h is produced for a round lower than rfirstHonestAfterSynch. This proves
that round rfirstHonestAfterSynch meets the conditions listed in Lemma 16.
Theorem 2. The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Weak-Liveness.
Proof. Obvious from the definition of optimal Weak-Liveness and Lemmas 16 and 17.
4.4 Robustness Proof
Lemma 18. IBFT 2.0 achieves optimal Persistence.
Proof. The following considerations prove the Lemma:
• IBFT 2.0 implements the modification IBFT-M1 described in Section 5.1 of [15];
• Theorem 1 of [15] proves that modification IBFT-M1 and the guarantee that the IBFT-2.0-block-
finalisation-protocol provides optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety are sufficient conditions to ensure
the the IBFT 2.0 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence;
• Theorem 1 of this paper proves that IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-
fault-tolerant Safety.
The Persistence and Weak-Liveness properties have been proved by relying exclusively on the eventually
synchronous network model assumption. To prove the Liveness property we introduce the following assumption
which is a modified version of the Fair Scheduler assumption used by [1]. We show in Section 5.2.1 how the
IBFT 2.0 protocol can be modified to remove the need for this assumption.
Assumption 1 (Fair Network Behaviour Assumption). The Fair Network Behaviour Assumption states that
the probability that a message sent by a validator is received by another validator within time timeoutForRoundZero
3
is higher than 0.
Justification. The following considerations clarify why this assumption is indeed realistic:
• network latency is inherently probabilistic;
• it is expected that timeoutForRoundZero is set to a value at least 3 times higher that the known lower
measured message latency.
Lemma 19. Let FBh be the height of the finalised block FB . For any finalised block FB there eventually exists
a finalised block FB ′ with FB ′h ≥ FBh such that there is no change to the validator set in the next
⌊
n
FB′h
2
⌋
blocks.
Proof. Direct consequence of the following invariants of the algorithm for modifying the validator set:
• only one vote for adding or removing validators can be cast per block;
• more than half of the validators must cast a consistent vote for the vote to have effect.
A more detailed proof may be provided in a future version of this work.
Lemma 20. If the proposer for round 0 of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is
honest and all messages sent by honest validators in round 0 are delivered within time timeoutForRoundZero
3
then
the block proposed by the proposer is finalised within round 0.
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Proof. Let δ be timeoutForRoundZero
3
and p0 be the proposer for round 0 of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-
block-finalisation-protocol. The following sequence of events leads to the creation of a valid finalised block
completes in no more than 3 · δ time.
1. At time t, p0 sends a Proposal message for round 0.
2. By time t + δ all honest validators receive the Proposal message and therefore send a Prepare message
for the block included in the Proposal message.
3. By time t + 2 · δ all honest validators receive the Quorum(nh) − 1 Prepare messages sent by all honest
validators (except for the proposer) and therefore send a Commit message matching the Prepare and
Proposal messages received.
4. By time t+ 3 · δ all honest validators receive the Quorum(nh) Commit messages for round r which are
sufficient to create a valid finalised block.
Lemma 21. Let FB be a generic valid finalised block with height h. If the selected proposer logic is Round-
Robin (defined at page 8 of Section 3.1) and the validator set in the next f(nh) + 1 blocks does not change,
then the probability that at least one of the next f(nh) + 1 finalised blocks contains an Ethereum block created
by an honest validator is higher than 0.
Proof. Assume that a finalised block FB with height h has been created by a validator v while in round r.
Based on the Round-Robin proposer selection logic, the validator v′ selected to be the proposer for the first
round of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for the next height, h+ 1, is the same validator that would
have been selected as proposer for round r+1 for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
It is obvious that at least one proposer, say v′′, out of the next f(nh) + 1 validators selected by the proposer
selection function is honest. The Fair Network Behaviour Assumption implies that the probability that v′′
receives Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages and can therefore create a valid Proposal message is higher
than 0. Also, Lemma 20 and the Fair Network Behaviour Assumption imply that the probability that the
block proposed by v′′ is finalised is higher than 0. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 22. If the proposer selection logic is Round-Robin, then for any Ethereum block EB included in a
valid finalised block, an Ethereum block EB ′ with height higher than the height of EB and created by an honest
validator will be eventually finalised.
Proof. Let FBh be the height of the generic finalised block FB . Based on Lemma 19, there eventually exists
a finalised block FB ′ with FB ′h ≥ FBh such that there is no change to the validator set in the next
⌊
n
FB′h
2
⌋
blocks. Based on Lemma 21, for any block FB such that there is no change to the validator set in the next
f(nFBh)+ 1 blocks, the probability that none of the Ethereum blocks included in the next f(nFBh)+ 1 blocks
is created by an honest validator is lower than 1. Since
⌊
n
2
⌋
≥ f(n) + 1, this implies that the probability
that the Lemma is false approaches 0 as the blockchain height goes to infinity. This last implication and the
Weak-Liveness property of IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol (Theorem 2) which ensures that eventually a
new block is added to the chain prove the Lemma.
Lemma 23. The IBFT 2.0 protocol with Round-Robin proposer selection logic guarantees optimal Liveness.
Proof. If a transaction is sent to all validators, since (i) as proved in Lemma 22, for any finalised block FB there
eventually exists a finalised block that has height higher than FB and that includes an Ethereum block created
by an honest validator and (ii) honest validators employee a fair transaction selection logic, the transaction
will be eventually included in a finalised block.
Theorem 3. IBFT 2.0 is a robust blockchain protocol when operating in an eventually synchronous network
with no more than f(nh) Byzantine validators for each blockchain height h.
Proof. Obvious from Lemmas 18 and 23.
5 Improvements
In this section we discuss a series of possible improvements applicable to the IBFT 2.0 protocol described in
Section 3. We call this protocol
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5.1 Reduction of the number of assumptions required for the correctness of the
protocol
5.1.1 Improvement 1: Remove the Fair Network Behaviour Assumption
Modification In order to remove the dependency of the robustness proof on the Fair Network Behaviour
Assumption it is sufficient to require that the proposer selection function for height h only selects validators
that did not propose any of the latest f(nh) blocks where nh is the number of validators for the block with
height h.
This modification corresponds to replacing the proposer(·, ·) function of the IBFT 2.0 protocol with the
FairProposer function defined below:
Algorithm 3: FairProposer(chain, r)
1: FairProposer(chain, r)≡
2: let n ≡ n(chain)
3: let latestfProposers ≡ proposers of the lastest f(n) blocks of chain
4: i← 0; p← ⊥
5: while i < r + 1 do
6: p← proposer(chain,i)
7: if not (p in latestfProposers) then
8: i← i+ 1
9: end
10: end
11: return p
Justification This modification reduces the number of possible proposers for the next block from nh down
to nh − f(nh). Which implies that the minimum number of honest proposers for the next block is reduced
from nh − f(nh) down to nh − 2 · f(nh). It is quite easy to prove that nh − 2 · f(nh) > 0 which means that
this modification guarantees that at least one of the possible proposers for the next block is honest. It is quite
easy to see how this in turn implies that this modification does not affect the validity of the Weak-Liveness
and Liveness properties proved in Section 4.
For any finalised block FB with height h, provided that there is no change to the validator list in the next
f(nh)+1 blocks, since we assume that no more than f(nh) validators are Byzantine, this modification ensures
that at least one out of the next f(nh) + 1 finalised blocks includes an Ethereum block created by an honest
validator. It should be noted how this last statement can be used as sketch proof for Lemma 22 without
depending on the Fair Network Behaviour Assumption any more.
5.2 Reduction of the block finalisation latency
5.2.1 Improvement 2: Reduce the minimum number of communication phases from three down
to two
Modification In the IBFT 2.0 protocol, the minimum number of communication phases required to fi-
nalise a block is three even if all validators are honest and the message transmission latency is less than
timeoutForRoundZero
3
:
1. The proposer for round 0 and instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol sends a Proposal
message to all validators;
2. All validators of height h, excluding the proposer for round 0, reply by sending a Prepare message to all
validators;
3. All validators of height h, once they receive the Proposal message for round 0 from the proposer for
round 0 and Quorum(nh)− 1 Prepare messages from non-proposing validators for round 0, they send a
Commit message to all validators.
Once a validator for height h receives Quorum(nh) Commit messages for round 0 from the validators of
height h, it creates a finalised block;
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The modification described in this section, which is based on the very fast learning protocol presented by
Dutta et al. [4], allows reducing the minimum number of communication phases from three down to two:
1. The proposer for round 0 and instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol sends a Proposal
message to all validators;
2. All validators of height h, excluding the proposer for round 0, reply by sending a Prepare message to all
validators;
Once a validator for height h receives the Proposal message for round 0 from the proposer for round
0 and nh − 1 Prepare messages from all the non-proposing validators for round 0 it creates a finalised
block.
Block finalisation in only two communication phases can be accomplished only if all the following conditions
are met:
• all validators are honest;
• the network latency is less than timeoutForRoundZero
2
.
If we assume the same latency for the different communication phases, then when the conditions listed above
are met, this modification reduces the block finalisation latency by 33%. To be noted that when the conditions
listed above are not achieved, then the protocol degrades back to the performance of the original IBFT 2.0
protocol with no overhead.
This improvement requires applying the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol:
• If Improvement 5 is not applied, then a “Prepare seal” mast be added to the Prepare messages. If
Improvement 5 is applied, then the Prepare messages do not need to be modified;
• If a block is finalised in only two phases, then the commit seals include the signatures (or Prepare seals,
if Improvement 5 is not applied) of the nh − 1 Prepare messages;
• During the validation of a finalised block, if the number of commit seals is nh − 1 then the seals are
interpreted as signature (Prepare seals, if Improvement 5 is not applied) of Prepare messages, otherwise if
the number of seals isQuorum(nh) then they are interpreted as signature (Commit seals, if Improvement 5
is not applied) of Commit messages;
• When a validator sends a Round-Change message, if the validator has received a valid Proposal message
for round 0, but it has never prepared , then it must include the Proposal message in the Round-Change
message. After the first time that a validator prepares while running instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-
finalisation-protocol, the validator will only include the latest Prepared-Certificate in any Round-Change
message that it sends;
• When a validator sends a Proposal message for a round number higher than 0, if there exists an Ethereum
block EB such that:
– EB is the only one Ethereum block such that at least f(nh)+1 of the Round-Change messages form-
ing the Round-Change-Certificate (included in the Proposal message) include a Proposal message
for round 0 and for this block;
– no Round-Change message include a valid Prepared-Certificate
then the proposed block included in the Proposal message must include the Ethereum block EB .
If the conditions listed above are not met, then the Ethereum block to be included in a Proposal message
with height higher than 0 must be determined as specified by the original IBFT 2.0 protocol;
• On the reception of a Proposal message for a round higher than 0, the same calculation must be performed
to validate the Proposal message.
As per the description above, this modification allows reducing the minimum number of communication phases
from three down to two only for round 0. While it is possible to modify the IBFT 2.0 protocol to reduce the
minimum number of communication phases down to two for any round, because of the following reasons, we
believe that this optimisation should be applied only to round 0:
• applying the optimisation for rounds higher than 0 as well requires potentially increasing the size of the
Round-Change message by the size of one block as the latest accepted Proposal message and the latest
Prepared-Certificate can refer to two different blocks;
• if the conditions required to achieve block finalisation in two phases are not met for round 0, then either
(i) one or more validators are Byzantine and can therefore prevent block finalisation in two phases at any
round or (ii) the network latency is higher than timeoutForRoundZero
2
which means that block finalisation
latency is already higher than timeoutForRoundZero and therefore whether block finalisation is reached
in two or three phases at the next round adds only minimal improvement to the block finalisation latency.
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Justification In this paragraphs we provide a sketch proof to show that this modification does preserve the
Safety property of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Since any valid Proposal message for round higher than 0 includes Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages, if
the Ethereum block EB is finalised in two phases, then at least Quorum(nh) − f(nh) of the Round-Change
messages included in the Round-Change-Certificate included in the Proposal message for round 1 have been
sent by honest validators and they will therefore include the Proposal message received by the proposer of
round 0. Since Quorum(nh)−f(nh) ≥ f(nh)+1 (quite easy to prove), the number of Proposal messages for the
Ethereum block EB is ≥ f(nh) + 1. Also, since all honest validators will include the Proposal message for the
Ethereum block EB in the Round-Change that they send for round 1 and there are at most f(nh) Byzantine
validators, then it is impossible that there exists another Ethereum block EB ′ different from EB for which
f(nh) + 1 Round-Change messages including matching Proposal messages are sent. These two considerations
imply that the only Ethereum block that a valid Proposal message for round 1 can include is EB . Because
honest validators can only prepare on the Ethereum block included in a valid Proposal message, the only block
that any honest validator can prepare on in round 1 is EB . Therefore, any Round-Change for round 2 sent by
honest validators will either include a Proposal message for the Ethereum block EB , or a Prepared-Certificate
for the same Ethereum block EB . This argument can be generalised to any round by induction on the round
number.
5.2.2 Improvement 3: Reduce the latency required for Quorum(nh) validators to be in the
same round for sufficient time to create a finalised block
Modification This improvement requires applying the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
When a validator running the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol receives f(nh) + 1
Round-Change messages for height h and round number higher than the current round number, it (i) starts
the round number corresponding the lowest round number amongst the set of f(nh)+1 Round-Change messages
received that have round number higher than the current one and (ii) sends a Round-Change messages for this
round number.
Justification Since there are no more than f(nh) Byzantine validators, if a validator v receives f(nh) + 1
Round-Change messages for height h and round number higher than the current round number, then at least
one honest validator is in a round higher than the current one. Specifically, at least one honest validator is
in a round equal to or higher than the lowest round number amongst the set of f(nh) + 1 Round-Change
messages received. Therefore moving to this round allows validator v to start this higher round sooner than in
the original IBFT 2.0 protocol. It can be seen how this modification does not affect any of the Lemmas used
to prove the robustness of the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
5.3 Decrease message size
5.3.1 Improvement 4: Replace the Round-Change messages included in the Round-Change-
Certificate included in Proposal messages with the hashes of the Round-Change messages
Modification This improvement requires replacing the Round-Change messages included in the Round-
Change-Certificate included in Proposal messages with the hashes of the Round-Change messages. We call
the set of hashes of Round-Change messages included in a Proposal message as effect of this modification
Round-Change-Hash-Certificate. This improvement requires validators to cache Round-Change messages that
they receive and then verify a Proposal message by using a Round-Change-Certificate composed of the received
Round-Change messages for which Keccak hash matches one of the hashes included in the Round-Change-
Hash-Certificate.
If this modification is applied, then the block hash field can be removed from the Proposal message and
the proposed block field can be moved inside the signed portion of the message. The reason why Proposal
messages in the original IBFT 2.0 protocol include the block hash in the signed portion of the message is to
reduce the size of Proposal messages with round higher than 0. This because in the original IBFT 2.0 protocol
a signed Proposal message with enough information to “bind” it to a proposed block must be included in
Proposal messages for round higher then 0 as part of the Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change-
Certificate. It should be obvious why if this improvement is applied, then the size of Proposal messages for
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rounds higher than 0 becomes independent of the block size.
Similarly, if this improvement is applied then the size of Proposal messages for rounds higher than 0 becomes
independent of the Round-Change message size. Therefore, there is no more need to split the Round-Change
message between a signed portion and an unsigned portion and all message fields can be moved within the
signed portion of the message.
Justification The justification for this modification is based on how the Gossip protocol works. Specifically,
when a validator receives a message from one of its peers, it transmits that message to all other peers. This
is essentially similar to how the transmission of a message works: a message is sent to all peers. The only
difference between the reception and the transmission is that when a message is received the message is not
transmitted to the peer that sent it as that peer already has the message. Hence, in the IBFT 2.0 protocol,
when a validator sends a Proposal message for a round higher than 0, the Round-Change messages included
in the Round-Change-Certificate have already been transmitted to the same peers that the Proposal message
will be transmitted to. Since a validator sends a Proposal message as soon as it receives Quorum(nh) Round-
Change messages, the Round-Change messages included in the Proposal message are transmitted to the peers
not long before the Proposal message is transmitted as well.
To be noted that the Round-Change-Certificate cannot be removed from the Proposal message as validators
receiving a Proposal message must be able to determine whether any valid block or only a prepared block could
have been included as proposed block in the Proposal message. If the Round-Change-Certificate is completely
removed then the only way for validators to validate Proposal messages is to receive a Round-Change message
from each of the nh validators which could impair the liveness of the protocol as f(nh) of the validators may
be Byzantine and never send a Round-Change message.
5.3.2 Improvement 5: Remove the commit seal from the Commit message and replace the
commit seals included in a block with the signatures of the Commit messages received
Modification This improvement requires the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol:
• remove the commit seal from the Commit message;
• when composing a finalisation proof, collate the signatures of Quorum(nh) valid Commit messages sent
by distinct validators;
• when validating a finalised block, reconstruct the body of the Commit message that would have been
sent for the block under validation and verify that each of the signatures included in the finalisation
proof is a valid signature of the reconstructed Commit message by one of the validators. This can be
done via the Elliptic Curve Signature Recovery function.
Justification Finalised blocks include all of the information required to reconstruct the body of the Commit
message sent for that specific block, namely: the block height, the round number at which the Quorum(nh)
Commit messages where received and the hash of the block.
5.3.3 Improvement 6: Reduce the number of messages included in Prepared-Certificates and
the number of commit seals included in finalisation proofs to the minimum required to
guarantee the robustness of the protocol
Modification This improvement requires to apply the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol:
• for any Prepared-Certificate included in a Round-Change message, include only Quorum(nh)−1 Prepare
messages for the current round, instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol and block hash
matching the accepted Proposal, even if more Prepare messages with the same characteristics have been
received;
• for any finalisation proof, include only Quorum(nh) commit seals included in valid Commit messages
for the current round, instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol and block hash matching the
accepted Proposal, even if more commit seals included in valid Commit messages have been received.
Justification As per IBFT 2.0 protocol definition, all of the received Prepare messages for the current round,
instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol and block hash matching the accepted Proposal message
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are included in a Prepared-Certificate. Similarly, as per IBFT 2.0 protocol definition, all of the available
commit seals received as part of Commit messages for the current round, instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-
finalisation-protocol and block hash matching the accepted Proposal are included in a finalisation proof. As it
can be seen from the robustness analysis in Section 4, the number of messages included in Prepared-Certificates
and the number of commit seals included in finalisation proofs can be reduced as indicated by this improvement
without affecting the robustness of the protocol.
5.3.4 Improvement 7: Remove the Proposal message from the Prepared-Certificate
Modification The Proposal message included in the Prepared-Certificates can be removed without impact-
ing the robustness of the protocol. While this improvement reduces the message size only marginally, it allows
simplifying a bit the Prepared-Certificate validation logic.
Justification In this paragraph we provide a sketch proof to show how this modification does not affect the
robustness of the protocol. Specifically, we show that Lemma 5, which states that “no two Prepared-Certificates
for the same round and for different block hashes can be created ”, still holds if this improvement is applied.
Proof. By contradiction assume that the Lemma is false and two Prepared-Certificates, say PC and PC′ are
created for the same round r but for different block hashes, say H and H ′ respectively. We distinguish two
cases: the proposer for round r is honest and the proposer for round r is Byzantine.
Case 1: the proposer for round r is honest. In each Prepared-Certificate there are at least
Quorum(nh) − f(nh) − 1 Prepare messages sent by honest validators. It is easy to verify that this number
is always higher than 0. Since honest validators send only Prepare messages matching the accepted Proposal
message, the honest validators that sent the Prepare messages included in PC must have received a Proposal
message for block hash H , whereas the honest validators that sent the Prepare messages included in PC′ must
have received a Proposal message for block hash H ′. This is in clear contradiction with the invariant (easily
deductible from the pseudocode) that honest proposers never send different Proposal messages for the same
round number.
Case 2: the proposer for round r is Byzantine. Since the Prepare messages included in Prepared-
Certificates are sent by non-proposing validators, no more than f(nh)− 1 Prepare messages in any Prepared-
Certificate are sent by Byzantine validators. Conversely, at least Quorum(nh)−1−(f(nh)−1) ≡ Quorum(nh)−
f(nh) of the Prepare messages are sent by honest validators. Since any set of Quorum(nh) validators contains
at least Quorum(nh) − f(nh) honest validators, Lemma 1 implies that the intersection of any two sets of
Quorum(nh)−f(nh) honest validators is not empty and therefore includes at least one honest validator. From
here the proof proceeds like in Lemma 5.
5.3.5 Improvement 8: Remove repeated message bodies from the Prepared-Certificate included
in a Round-Change message
Modification Replace the set of Proposal and Prepare messages included in a Prepared-Certificate with a
set including only the following pieces of information:
• round number of the messages included in the Prepared-Certificate;
• block hash of the block included in the Proposal and Prepare messages included in the Prepared-
Certificate;
• the signature of the Proposal message included in the Prepared-Certificate;
• all the signatures of the Prepare messages included in the Prepared-Certificate.
A Prepared-Certificate constructed as described above can be validated by reconstructing the body of the
Proposal and Prepare messages included in the original Prepared-Certificate by using the pieces of information
listed above (the height is provided as part of the Round-Change message) and verifying that (i) the signature
for the Proposal message is a valid signature of the proposer (for the round number included in the modified
version of the Prepared-Certificate) over the Proposal message body and (ii) each Prepare signature is a correct
signature of one of the non-proposing validators (for the round number included in the modified version of the
Prepared-Certificate) over the Prepare message body.
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Justification The body of all the Prepare messages included in a Prepared-Certificate is identical. The
body of a Proposal message varies from the body of a Prepare message only in the message type.
5.3.6 Improvement 9: Use an aggregate signature scheme for the Prepared-Certificate
Modification The size of the Prepared-Certificate can be further reduced by employing an aggregate sig-
nature scheme which allows replacing the Quorum(nh) − 1 signatures of the Prepare messages with a single
signature.
5.4 Improve the semantics of the messages
5.4.1 Improvement 10: Do not consider the round number when computing the block hash
included in IBFT 2.0 messages
Modification As per definition of the IBFT 2.0 protocol, the block hash included in the IBFT 2.0 messages
is calculated over a tuple composed of the Ethereum block and the current round number. This improvement
requires replacing this hash with the hash of the Ethereum block only. To be noted that it is still required to
include the current round number in the finalisation proof.
Justification The purpose of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is to decide on the
Ethereum block to be added at height h. Therefore, using the PBFT [3] terminology, the value to be decided
by each instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is the Ethereum block, not the tuple composed
by the Ethereum block and the current round number. The round number is added to the finalisation proof
exclusively because the finalisation proof composed of Quorum(nh) commit seals is valid only if these commit
seals were included in Commit messages targeting the same round number.
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